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The classical quantity-setting (Cournot) oligopoly describes a situation of com-
petition between ﬁrms that strategically decide how much to produce. Its ele-
gance and simplicity has inspired a broad range of theoretical models with ap-
plications in industrial organization, public ﬁnance, environmental economics,
trade theory, etc. So it is hardly surprising that the Cournot model has also
spawned a constant stream of experimental literature beginning with the studies
by Hoggatt (1959) and Selten and Sauermann (1959) and continuing until today.
A stylized result of these experiments is that subjects in oligopolies with three
or more ﬁrms hardly collude. More precisely, in all these “large” oligopolies
subjects select quantities close to the Cournot-Nash outcome. In duopolies,
some collusion is observed, but even then the average quantities selected by the
subjects are closer to the Cournot-Nash outcome than to the symmetric joint
proﬁt-maximizing outcome (see, for example, the meta-analysis by Huck et al.,
2004). In reality, however, collusion is sometimes observed even when a dozen
entities or more are involved. For instance, the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a cartel of 12 countries that has been operating
since the 1960s. Motta (2007) reports on a legal procedure against a cartel of
40 wood-pulp producers from seven countries. Although there is doubt whether
all 40 ﬁrms actually colluded, there is strong evidence that two sub-groups of
these 40 ﬁrms, consisting of 9 and 25 ﬁrms, respectively, have indeed engaged
in long-term collusion. Additionally, Genesove and Mullin (2001) report on the
Sugar Institute, a cartel that consisted of 14 cane sugar reﬁning capacity ﬁrms.
This cartel operated from 1927 until 1936, when the U.S Supreme Court ruled
its activities illegal.
Obviously, we cannot directly compare real-business cartels with the out-
comes observed in the laboratory, mainly because in the business world we only
observe successful cartels (or those detected by the anti-trust law), and also
1because in the business world the coordination of quantities (or prices) is usu-
ally forbidden.1 But it is still true that we observe too little collusion in the
laboratory compared with what we should expect. How can we explain the fact
that two-ﬁrm industries sometimes sustain collusion in the lab, while three-ﬁrm
and larger industries are almost never able to do so? One possible argument
is that people behave diﬀerently in the laboratory from when they are making
real business decisions (see, for instance, Haan et al., 2009). Another possible
explanation is that Cournot experiments do not allow for communication be-
tween ﬁrms, whereas in the business world, coordination of quantities through
communication between managers is possible (although, in most instances, ille-
gal). In fact, evidence from the Sugar Institute2 (Genesove and Mullin, 2001)
highlights the crucial role of explicit communication between the ﬁrms in estab-
lishing collusion.
The aim of this paper is therefore to investigate the inﬂuence of pre-play
communication (“cheap talk”) in Cournot oligopoly experiments. Since the bor-
derline between collusion and Cournot play is, loosely speaking, between two
and three ﬁrms, we speciﬁcally investigate pre-play communication in duopoly
and triopoly. Moreover, besides the usual subject pool of students we have also
enlisted managers as subjects. Accordingly, this study investigates how (i) com-
munication, (ii) subject pool, and (iii) oligopoly size, impact on the outcomes.
The experimental design is sketched in Figure 1.
- Figure 1 about here -
Exploring the relevant literature on communication in economic experiments,
we ﬁnd an important distinction regarding the communication device in use.
1Regarding this last point, Bryant and Eckard (1991) ﬁnd that the probability of getting
caught in a given year in the USA between 1961-1988 was at most between 0.13 and 0.17.
2The evidence is based on detailed notes of the Board of Directors, Executive Committee,
and Enforcement Committee meetings from January 1929 to mid 1930.
2Crawford (1998) distinguishes between “a preexisting common language that
ties down the literal meanings of cheap talk messages” (Crawford, 1998, p.289)
and non-common language devices. He claims that common language “reduces
the multiplicity of equilibria by restricting the plausible interpretation of out-
of-equilibrium messages” (Crawford, 1998, p.289). In our design we therefore
implement two types of communication devices, a standardized one, only allow-
ing subjects to coordinate on quantities, and a open language device allowing
free communication between subjects.
Although the eﬀect of communication on performance has been experimen-
tally investigated in the context of price-setting oligopoly with both homoge-
neous and diﬀerentiated products (Hinloopen and Soetevent, 2008 and Fried-
man, 1967, respectively), and also in other experiments in the ﬁeld of industrial
organization (see Holt, 1995 for a review), it has not yet been investigated in
the context of classic Cournot competition3.
In economic theory (non-binding) communication is referred to as “cheap
talk”, since it does not directly aﬀect the subjects’ payoﬀs. In particular, Au-
mann (1990) claims that communication cannot aﬀect the outcome of a game
if a signaler has a strict preference over the other players’ strategy choice. This
is precisely the case with Cournot oligopoly, since a ﬁrm prefers its competitor
to select the lowest possible quantity. By contrast, Brown-Kruse and Schenk
(2000) claim that communication may facilitate collusion by reducing the time
it takes for ﬁrms to “learn to collude”. They argue that even if one player is able
to identify the optimal solution without communication and tries to signal it to
the other player, it is in the interest of the other player to be a slow learner.4 In
addition, Crawford (1998) conjectures that communication plays an important
3In fact, communication was allowed in a Cournot experiment by Daughety and Forsythe
(1987a) and Daughety and Forsythe (1987b). However, these authors were interested in the
performance of regulated markets and the eﬀect of communication alone was not isolated in
their design.
4Brown-Kruse and Schenks’ (2000) argument refers to the prisoners’ dilemma, but it can
equally be applied to the Cournot competition game.
3“reassurance” role that facilitates collusion by reducing the uncertainty about
the others’ actions. The bottom line is that the impact of non-binding com-
munication on behavior is rather ambiguous. It seems that although pre-play
communication is considered as “cheap-talk” it could still considerably aﬀect
subjects’ performance. Section 2 presents a brief review of the literature on
oligopoly experiments with communication.
Regarding the subject pool eﬀect, the external validity of Cournot experi-
ments conducted with students has hardly been challenged, despite the focus on
ﬁrms’ behavior and the large number of experimental studies carried out so far.
Recently, Waichman et al. (2010a) have shown that managers are slightly (but
signiﬁcantly!) less competitive than students in a Cournot triopoly. These au-
thors later show that this result extends also for the duopoly case (Waichman
et al., 2010b). An interesting question arises regarding whether or not man-
agers make use of communication devices in a more eﬀective way than students.
For this reason, we have recruited managers, mainly from the manufacturing
industry and students, both from Penang, West Malaysia.
We can summarize our results as follows: First, the eﬀect of communication
on collusion is larger in duopoly than in triopoly, all other conditions being
equal. In fact, communication has no eﬀect on the behavior of managers in
triopoly. Second, managers behave in a similar way under both communication
devices, while students are more inﬂuenced by the free communication than
by the standardized-communication device. More precisely, managers select, on
average, lower quantities than students, and communication increases the diﬀer-
ence between the subject pools in duopoly but reduces this diﬀerence in triopoly.
Third, in all treatments best response strategies explain output adjustment. In
the treatments with communication, however, the eﬀect of imitation becomes
larger and crowds out the eﬀect of myopic best response. Fourth, for both sub-
ject pools, we observe lower aggregate quantities and more collusion in duopoly
4than in triopoly. Finally, we establish that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quan-
tity describes the performance of the duopoly markets without communication
quite accurately, while the performance of these markets is more collusive when
communication is allowed. In triopoly, however, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
quantity accurately describes the behavior in almost all treatments. In other
words, communication does hardly increase collusion in triopoly.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we review the experi-
mental literature on pre-play communication in oligopolies and social dilemmas.
Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedure. Section 4 sketches
the hypotheses. In section 5 we describe the results, and ﬁnally section 6 con-
cludes.
2 Related Literature
Since the early study by Loomis (1959), who ﬁnds that pre-play communica-
tion (exchange of notes between subjects) enhances cooperation in a prisoners’
dilemma (PD) experiment, numerous other PD experiments have been con-
ducted. Sally (1995) summarizes these studies in a meta-analysis including
results from social dilemmas (especially PD experiments) between 1958 and
1992. In contrast to Loomis (1959), but in line with economic theory, Sally
ﬁnds that communication by sending messages to each other does not signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀect cooperation. On the other hand, face-to-face communication does
positively aﬀect cooperation. In a more recent meta-analysis of communica-
tion and cooperation in social dilemmas, Balliet (2010), like Sally (1995), ﬁnds
that face-to-face communication has a stronger positive eﬀect on collusion than
written messages. In contrast to Sally (1995), Balliet ﬁnds that written mes-
sages positively impact collusion. He also observes that in social dilemmas
the communication-collusion relationship is stronger in larger than in smaller
5groups.
In the area of oligopoly, pre-play communication has been tested experimen-
tally in various contexts: in a price competition context with both homogeneous
and diﬀerentiated products, in a spatial competition oligopoly ` a la Hotelling,
and also in diﬀerent types of auctions. The only Cournot experiments allowing
explicit communication between the subjects were conducted by Daughety and
Forsythe (1987a,b).5 These authors report on two Cournot duopoly experiments
(and also a triopoly treatment) where communication takes place in the form
of sending messages. They ﬁnd that, when ﬁrms are able to communicate, they
collude much more than without communication. However, since these experi-
ments were designed to investigate the impact of price ceilings on the industries,
the eﬀect of communication is not isolated by comparing treatments with and
without communication (under a similar condition of no regulation).
Regarding the impact of communication in a price competition game with
homogeneous products (` a la Bertrand), a series of experiments has been con-
ducted to test the eﬀectiveness of anti-trust policies (especially the eﬀectiveness
of leniency programs). In these experiments, conducted by Apesteguia et al.
(2007), Andersson and Wengstr¨ om (2007), Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008),
and Bigoni et al. (2009), subjects were allowed to communicate with each other
and coordinate prices. However, only the triopoly study by Hinloopen and
Soetevent (2008) directly tests the eﬀect of pre-play communication on collusion,
whereas the other studies focus on comparison between the diﬀerent anti-trust
policies. Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) ﬁnd that communication alone does
not aﬀect the average price (nor even its evolution over time). Andersson and
Wengstr¨ om (2007) ﬁnd that in a duopoly with random-matching costly commu-
nication enhances the stability of collusive agreement in comparison with free
5Holt (1995) reports on another experiment by Binger et al. (1990). The working paper
version is no longer available, and at least the part including the pre-play communication has
not been published elsewhere.
6communication. Friedman (1967) investigates the eﬀect of communication on
a price competition duopoly with a high degree of product diﬀerentiation. His
design allows written communication and reply from one subject to the other.
Friedman ﬁnds that in over three-fourths of the rounds the proposal submitted
was accepted (and in 90% of the cases honored) and over three-fourths of these
agreements were Pareto-optimal.
Regarding the impact of communication in a spatial competition game, Brown-
Kruse et al. (1993) and Brown-Kruse and Schenk (2000) report experimental
results from repeated spatial competition with free-form communication via
written messages between the subjects. They ﬁnd that the introduction of
communication turns the predominant outcome from the Nash outcome to the
joint proﬁt-maximizing outcome.
A series of experiments aiming at investigating the eﬀect of face-to-face com-
munication on diﬀerent market institutions (e.g. double auction, posted-oﬀer,
and sealed bid auction) show that communication does not result in sustainable
performance around the collusive level. In particular, Isaac and Plott (1981)
and Isaac et al. (1984) test the impact of communication on performance in a
double auction with four sellers and four buyers. They do not ﬁnd that commu-
nication is suﬃcient to maintain collusion. Isaac et al. (1984) test the impact
of communication on performance in posted-oﬀer markets (with four sellers and
four buyers), ﬁnding that, although the observed prices exceed the competitive
equilibrium prices (and also exceed the prices resulting from a double auction),
they do not show a clear tendency to converge to the collusive level. Finally,
Isaac and Walker (1985) conduct a similar experiment with a sealed-bid auc-
tion (four bidders) and also ﬁnd that, overall, collusion is not sustainable. In
addition, Holt and Davis (1990) and Cason (1995) investigate the eﬀect of com-
munication via written messages on posted-oﬀer triopoly and duopoly markets,
respectively. They both ﬁnd that, although communication has some temporary
7eﬀect on collusion, this inﬂuence vanishes over time.
In summary, the literature provides rather mixed evidence regarding the
inﬂuence of pre-play communication on the outcome of oligopoly markets. It
appears that the inﬂuence of communication depends on the speciﬁc institution
and the experimental design. The eﬀect of communication on diﬀerent oligopoly
sizes and on non-standard subject populations has not yet been examined in
quantity, price, or location-setting oligopolies.
3 Experimental Design and Procedure
We adopt the design proposed by Huck et al. (2004) for the duopoly and tri-
opoly cases. Overall, we test the eﬀect of no communication, the so-called
‘standardized-communication’ device allowing ﬁrms to coordinate quantities,
and a device that allows ﬁrms to communicate freely. We use two subject pop-
ulations, Malaysian students and Malaysian managers.
3.1 Underlying model and design
The basic set-up is a ﬁxed-matching symmetric quantity-setting (Cournot) game,
where each subject represents a single ﬁrm producing a homogeneous good.
The experiment lasts 17 rounds6, and the feedback received by the subjects
after each round contains only aggregate information about their competitors’
performance. We restricted ourselves to 17 rounds because the high opportu-
nity cost of managers made it impossible to run an experiment longer than 1.5
hours.7 Within each duopoly (triopoly), ﬁrms were identiﬁed as either ﬁrm ‘1’
6The triopoly control treatments (without communication) lasts 25 rounds. For compara-
bility we report here the result of the ﬁrst 17 rounds.
7This should not considerably aﬀect the results since evidence from long experiments (with
40 rounds) yield either no diﬀerences or very small diﬀerences between the ﬁrst and last rounds
(see, for instance, Huck et al., 2000). Speciﬁcally, we draw our design from Huck et al. (2004),
an experiment consisting of 25 rounds. Huck et al. (2004) ﬁnd that after the ﬁrst 3-4 periods
there is no time trend. Finally, there are several contemporary studies of Cournot oligopoly
conducted with about 20 (or fewer) rounds (e.g, Holcomb and Nelson, 1997, Huck et al., 2001,
8or ﬁrm ‘2’ (ﬁrm ‘3’). In the treatments with communication, subjects enter
the ‘communication stage’ at the beginning of each round. They then have two
minutes to communicate with each other via written messages (they can only
communicate within their industry and have no interaction with ﬁrms in other
industries). After this, subjects enter the ‘decision stage’, where they have two
minutes to select their quantities. During this stage subjects could not com-
municate with their competitors, but on their screens they could still see the
exchange that had taken place at the communication-stage.
In the standardized-communication treatments, subjects can coordinate quan-
tities by stating “I suggest that I will produce A units, ﬁrm 2 will produce B
units, and ﬁrm 3 will produce C units” (where A, B, and C are any numbers
from the choice set). Subjects can also click on “I agree” and “I do not agree” to
express their satisfaction or frustration with the exchange. It is not obligatory
to send messages or to suggest positive quantities for any of the subjects. This
means that a ﬁrm could use, for example, a technique of “leading by example”
by omitting quantities B and C. In the free-communication treatments, ﬁrms
can communicate with each other using a chat box. However, they are not
allowed to identify themselves.8
Throughout both stages of the experiment, subjects are allowed to use a
proﬁt calculator to simulate the result of their choices, given their own and
a hypothetical quantity selected by the other ﬁrms. Moreover, in both stages
subjects are informed about the outcome of the previous round. The computer
screenings of the communication and the decision stages are provided in the
Appendix (Figures A.1-A.5). The control treatment (without communication)
is identical to what has been described here but without the communication
stage.
Fonseca et al., 2005, Altavilla et al., 2006, etc.).
8We stressed that participants who tries to disclose their identity would not be paid for
the experiment.
9The ﬁrms act in a market with the following demand function:
P(Q) = max{100 − Q,0}, (1)
where Q =
Pn
i=1 qi, n = 2,3. The cost function for each seller is
C (qi) = qi (2)
Subjects can select quantities between 0 and 100 in steps of 0.01. Under this
setting, the benchmark market quantities are given in Table 1. One way to
evaluate the propensity of sellers to tacitly collude is to follow the convention
adopted by Fouraker and Siegel (1963) and divide the aggregate output space
into three ranges associated with the three types of strategies.9
- Table 1 about here -
3.2 Subject recruitment and control
We recruited a total of 182 undergraduate students (58% women, 55% of Chinese
ethnicity10) from Universiti Sains Malaysia in Penang Island, West Malaysia.
Most of them were attending economics and business courses, but some of them
were students of anthropology, mathematics, physics, social work, and sociol-
ogy. Additionally, we recruited a total of 164 Malaysian managers (48% women,
92% of Chinese ethnicity11) from small and medium-sized ﬁrms (companies em-
9The midpoint of the ranges between collusive and Cournot, and Cournot and competitive
demarcates the range boundaries.
10There are three major ethnic groups in Malaysia. The ﬁrst and largest includes the
Malay population (Muslims by constitutional deﬁnition). The second-largest group includes
Malaysians of Chinese descent (for short “Chinese”). The smallest of the three major groups
includes Malaysians of Indian descent (“Indians” for short). Penang is the only non-Malay-
dominated state in Malaysia. 43.4% of the population are Chinese, 40.2% are Malay, and
9.9% are Indian.
11The proportions of Chinese in the manager sample is considerably larger than in the
student sample. The reason for this is that most Chinese work in the private sector while
Malays have better chances of being employed in the public sector.
10ploying at least 50 staﬀ). Most of these were from the manufacturing industry
(plastics, cable assemblers, chip manufacturers, and computer-parts manufac-
turers), some from ﬁnancial institutions and other industries in Penang. Tar-
get companies were sourced from the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers
(FMM) directory, which lists all the small and medium-sized ﬁrms (SME) in
Penang state. A letter of invitation was sent to the company secretary12, asking
him/her to forward it to the relevant person in the company (we only approached
managers with at least ﬁve staﬀ members working under their supervision). In
total, about 50% of the managers who received our invitation letters signed up
for the experiment. Manager ages ranged between 25 and 54 (average age 35.1),
and all of them had at least a Bachelor’s degree (ﬁve of them were PhDs). The
estimated earnings of the selected group ranged between 4000 RM (Malaysian
Ringgit) and 9000 RM per month, with an estimated average of 5000-6000 RM
(≈1500-1900$). The subjects had not previously participated in an experiment.
Table 2 shows the characteristics of the subjects in each treatment (and the
abbreviations of the diﬀerent treatments).13
- Table 2 about here -
The Cournot model describes a very simplistic, strategic decision taken simul-
taneously by ﬁrms. In reality, a corresponding decision is taken by the company
CEOs (or by the boards of executives). It is, however, almost impossible to get
companies’ CEOs to participate in an economic experiment due to their high
opportunity costs. Therefore, as an alternative or proxy, researchers in exper-
imental economics recruit high-level decision-makers in charge of employees to
play the role of ﬁrms. Although these high-level decision-makers are usually not
CEOs, they are, nevertheless, more representative than university students in
12We did not reveal the nature of the experiment, merely that it was a computer-based
experiment designed to analyze decision-making. We also disclosed the expected payoﬀ range.
13A list of the individual characteristics of the managers can be obtained from the authors
upon request.
11playing the role of ﬁrms in experiments on industrial organization.14
The experiment was programmed and conducted using the z-Tree experi-
mental program (Fischbacher, 2007). It was explained and conducted in En-
glish. The exchange rate between the experimental currency units (ECU) and
the Malaysian Ringgit was calculated to provide suﬃcient saliency so that a
Malaysian student choosing the Nash-equilibrium quantity throughout the ex-
periment (given that his or her competitors also decide on the Nash equilibrium
quantity) earns about 3.5$ (9.5 Malaysian Ringgit), while a Malaysian manager
earns about 60$.
4 Hypotheses
The experimental design and the unique set of subjects enable us to focus on
three research questions. First, does communication facilitate collusion? Sec-
ond, do mangers behave diﬀerently than students? Third, does oligopoly size
aﬀect the outcome?
Although the evidence on the inﬂuence of communication in facilitating col-
lusion is rather ambiguous (see Section 2), the studies by Friedman (1967) on
price competition with diﬀerentiated products (using a proﬁt table that resem-
bles Cournot experiments) and on regulated Cournot markets by Daughety and
Forsythe (1987a,b) strongly indicate that communication fosters and sustains
collusion. Accordingly, we formulate our ﬁrst hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1: In the treatments with communication, we expect to observe
lower aggregate quantities and more collusion compared to the control treat-
14Other experimental studies in industrial organization also recruit diﬀerent levels of man-
agers. For example, Cooper (2006), recruited managers from an Executive MBA program,
while Cooper et al. (1999) recruited managers and white-collar workers in state enterprises in
China. Montmarquette et al. (2004) use managers from the headquarters of a large French-
German pharmaceutical company. Finally, Fehr and List (2004) and Alp´ ızar et al. (2004)
recruited coﬀee-mill CEOs from Costa Rica.
12ment without communication.
Evidence from experiments without communication (Waichman et al., 2010a,b)
show that managers selects lower aggregate quantities and collude more than
students. We, therefore, expect to observe such diﬀerences also with communi-
cation.
Hypothesis 2: In the treatments with managers, we expect to observe lower
aggregate quantities and more collusion compared to the treatment using stu-
dent subjects.
The early study by Fouraker and Siegel (1963) (with two-and three-ﬁrm in-
dustries) identiﬁes more collusion and, on average, lower quantities in duopoly
than triopoly. Moreover, in a meta-analysis aiming to identify the eﬀect of the
number of ﬁrms on Cournot oligopoly, Huck et al. (2004) ﬁnd that collusion is
sometimes observed in duopoly but almost never in triopoly. Accordingly, we
formulate our last hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 3: We expect to observe more collusion (and lower aggregate
quantities) in duopoly than in triopoly even when communication is allowed.
5 Results
While our analysis focuses mainly on aggregate (market) performance, we also
investigate the individual (ﬁrm) data in order to learn about behavioral regu-
larities manifesting themselves in the experiment. A common testing procedure
(used, for example, in Huck et al., 2004) is to average the quantities of each
market and then compare these independent (average) quantities. In the fol-
13lowing, we use this method for comparison between treatments (either between
the quantities or between the incidence of collusion).
Table 3 presents the aggregate quantities of each market averaged (i) over all
rounds, (ii) over the ﬁrst 15 rounds, and (iii) over rounds 3 to 15 (to exclude
beginning and end eﬀects). From this table it appears that the average quanti-
ties selected by the subjects are lower when communication is allowed. It also
appears that, all other conditions being equal, students select higher aggregate
quantities on average than managers. Recall that the quantities are classiﬁed
as collusive (M), Cournot-Nash (N), or competitive (C), depending on their
distance from the respective benchmark quantities. Looking into the data, we
ﬁnd that between 91% and 100% (or between 61% and 90%) of the markets in
the duopoly (triopoly) treatments are able to achieve collusion in at least one
round. Figure 2 displays, for each treatment, the percentage of markets that
are classiﬁed as collusive during a total of 0 rounds, 1 round, 2 rounds, and so
on. This ﬁgure shows that, by and large, there is a higher incidence of collusion
when communication is allowed.
- Table 3 around here -
- Figure 2 around here -
5.1 The eﬀect of communication
We begin our formal analysis by comparing the performance with and without
communication, while ﬁxing the other conditions (subject pool, oligopoly size).
We employ a (two-sided) robust rank-order test (F-P test, after Fligner and
Policello, 1981) to compare the independent market quantities (and also the
incidence of collusion (see Figure 2)) in each pair of treatments. The results are
14presented in Table 4.
- Table 4 around here -
Accordingly, we can summarize as follows:
Result 1a (students, duopoly): The control treatment results in higher ag-
gregate quantities (and a lower incidence of collusion) than the two treatments
with communication. We do not observe any diﬀerence in performance between
the two treatments with communication.
Result 1b (students, triopoly): The control treatment results in higher
aggregate quantities than the free-communication treatment. We do not ob-
serve any signiﬁcant diﬀerence in performance between the two treatments with
communication. In addition, we ﬁnd that the control treatment yields a consid-
erably lower incidence of collusion than the two treatments with communication.
Result 1c (managers, duopoly): The control treatment results in higher ag-
gregate quantities (and a lower incidence of collusion) than the two treatments
with communication. We do not observe any diﬀerence in performance between
the two treatments with communication.
Result 1d (managers, triopoly): We do not observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in performance (regarding both quantities and incidence of collusion) between
the three treatments.
The results presented so far imply that communication fosters collusion in
duopoly but has a moderate impact in triopoly. This aspect is illustrated
15by the rows denoting “% change” in Table 3, which describe the percentage
change in average performance from the corresponding control treatment. In
particular, this table shows that in comparison with the corresponding con-
trol treatments, the percentage reductions in output are, on average, higher
(or at least not lower) for duopoly than for triopoly. For instance, the student
free-communication treatment in duopoly ( ¯ Q1−17) achieves 12.29% reduction in
quantity in comparison with the control treatment, while in triopoly, the free-
communication treatment achieves 10.93% reduction. In the extreme case, the
manager free-communication treatment yields a reduction of 14.86% from the
control treatment in duopoly, but only a 4.83% reduction in the corresponding
triopoly treatment. Using a Kruskal-Wallis test comparing the median quanti-
ties of the three communication conditions in duopoly, we formally reject the
null hypothesis of equal median quantities between the treatments for both stu-
dents and managers (P-value 0.00 for each). However, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis for students (P-value 0.19) or managers (P-value 0.36) in a triopoly.
Result 1e: Communication has a stronger impact on collusion in duopoly than
in triopoly.
This result is in contrast to the meta-analysis by Balliet (2010), who ﬁnds
that the eﬀect of communication on collusion in social dilemmas is larger when
the group is larger.15
5.2 The eﬀect of the subject pool
After investigating the eﬀect of communication on the performance of the two
subject pools, we now compare performance across subject pools. Table 5
presents the results of F-P tests comparing independent market quantities (and
15The meta-analysis by Balliet (2010) includes mainly the prisoners’ dilemma, give-some
(public good), and take-some (common pool resources) games.
16also incidence of collusion) in each pair of treatments .
- Table 5 around here -
We can formalize the results as follows:
Result 2a (duopoly): In the two treatments with communication, managers
select lower aggregate quantities (and have a considerably higher incidence of
collusion) than students. We do not observe any considerable diﬀerence in per-
formance between the control treatments without communication.
Result 2b (triopoly): In the control treatments without communication,
managers select lower aggregate quantities than students, but we do not ob-
serve any diﬀerence in performance regarding the incidence of collusion. Nor
do we observe any diﬀerence in performance between the two treatments where
communication is allowed.
5.3 The eﬀect of oligopoly size
When comparing duopoly and triopoly treatments, we have to take into account
the discontinuity between a two-ﬁrm industry and industries with more than
two ﬁrms. In duopoly, once a ﬁrm receives feedback about its payoﬀ, it can eas-
ily deduce its competitor quantity and payoﬀ. This is however not the case with
industries with more than two ﬁrms, where the individual quantities and payoﬀs
cannot be deduced from the average quantity. Therefore, in a design providing
only aggregate information about the competitors, it is impossible to isolate the
size eﬀect from the information eﬀect. In addition, Holt (1995) highlights the
fact that even when subjects receive full information about their competitors’
17actions and proﬁts (and can thus monitor the competitors’ actions), it is impos-
sible in an industry with more than two ﬁrms to punish one competitor without
hurting the others.
Using an F-P test to compare the quantities selected in the duopoly and
triopoly treatments, we reject the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between the
quantities selected in the respective duopoly and triopoly treatments (P-values
0.00 in all comparisons, both for students and managers). This result indicates
that both students and managers select higher quantities in triopoly than in
duopoly, which is not surprising considering that the theorized Cournot-Nash
aggregate output is lower in duopoly than in triopoly (the other two benchmark
quantities do not depend on industry size). However, we ﬁnd that there is a
considerably higher incidence of collusion in the duopoly than in the triopoly
treatment (comparison between Figure 2(a) and 2(c) and between Figure 2(b)
and 2(d)). Given that the range of collusive outcomes is smaller in duopoly
than in triopoly, this is a remarkable result.
Result 3 (students, managers): Duopoly results in a higher incidence of
collusion (and lower aggregate quantity) than triopoly.
5.4 Characterizing the markets
Our next move is to investigate whether the benchmark outcomes (collusive,
Cournot-Nash, or competitive quantities) describe the market performance ac-
curately. Figure 3 shows the performance in the duopoly and triopoly treatment
for each independent market and also how close/far the average quantities of
each market are to/from the benchmark quantities.
- Figure 3 about here -
18It appears from this ﬁgure that in duopoly quantities are spread between
the collusive and Cournot-Nash outcomes, whereas in triopoly they are spread
around the Cournot-Nash outcome. We employ a one-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test16 and also a one-sample sign-rank test17 to investigate whether the
average quantities selected in the three treatments are diﬀerent from the collu-
sive and Cournot-Nash outcomes. We ﬁnd that the collusive outcome does not
describe the performance in any of the treatments for both duopoly and triopoly
(P-values are 0.00 in all treatments in the two tests). Regarding the Cournot-
Nash outcome, we ﬁnd, for the duopoly case, that the control treatments with
no communication and also the student standardized-communication treatment
do not yield signiﬁcantly diﬀerent quantities than the Cournot outcome. The
other treatments, however, yield lower aggregate quantities than the Cournot
outcome.
Result 4a (duopoly): Market performance without communication (and
when students communicate through the standardized-communication device)
is identiﬁed quite accurately by the Cournot outcome, while communication
leads to lower aggregate quantities (although still larger than the collusive out-
come).
We repeat the procedure for the triopoly treatments, now ﬁnding that in
all treatments except the student control treatment, the quantities are not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from the Cournot-Nash outcome.18 The quantities selected
in the student control treatment are larger than the Cournot-Nash outcome.19
16Following Raab and Schipper (2009), we test whether the distributions of the average
quantities in each treatment are diﬀerent from the normal distribution with a mean equal to
the corresponding benchmark quantity.
17This test checks whether the median quantity is diﬀerent from the respective benchmark
outcome.
18P-values ranging between 0.31 and 0.78 in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and between
0.18 and 0.65 in the sign-rank test.
19P-value of less than 0.02 in both tests.
19Thus, we can formulate our next result.
Result 4b (triopoly): The Cournot outcome describes market performance
quite accurately (except when students are playing and communication is not
allowed).
5.5 Individual (ﬁrm) behavior
The analysis of market quantities reveals diﬀerences in performance between
the treatments diverging with respect to the communication device, the subject
pool, and oligopoly size. Examining the individual data may reveal the behav-
ioral regularities leading to the diﬀerences in aggregate output levels. Taking
into account that subjects were provided with a proﬁt calculator and also re-
ceived information about performance in the previous round, they could easily
calculate their best response to their competitors’ quantity. Beside ‘best re-
sponse’ a subject could also play an ‘imitation’ strategy. In duopoly, subjects
can imitate their competitors, but in triopoly they could only identify the av-
erage quantity of their competitors since the subjects only receive aggregate
information about their competitors’ quantities. Accordingly, and following













i ) + β3 Chinese + β4 Male,
(3)
where qt
i is the quantity selected by subject i in round t. r
t−1
i denotes subject
i’s best response to the quantity in the previous round selected by the competi-
tor (or competitors in triopoly), and i
t−1
i denotes the quantity in the previous
round selected by the competitor in duopoly (or average quantity of competi-
tors in triopoly). Chinese is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a
20Malaysian of Chinese ethnicity and 0 otherwise (since diﬀerent ethnic groups
may have diﬀerent “propensities to cooperate”). Finally, Male is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 for a male and 0 for a female (Mason et al.,
1991 ﬁnd that females collude more than males in the ﬁrst rounds of a duopoly
experiment). Note that a subject who strictly plays a myopic best response
(‘imitation’) should have β1 = 1 (β2 = 1), while the other coeﬃcients should be
equal to zero. However, we do not expect to observe strict best response or im-
itation strategies, but rather coeﬃcients which are smaller than 1. In contrast
to Huck et al. (1999), we did not ﬁnd that variances changed over time,20 so
it is sensible to estimate the model (employing the pooled data of all subjects
in each treatment) by using OLS (clustering the standard errors within each
market). The estimation results are given in Table 6.
- Table 6 about here -
Table 6 indicates that Cournot play (best response) signiﬁcantly explains
output adjustments in all treatments, but when communication is allowed, the
magnitude of this coeﬃcient is reduced. On the other hand, the inﬂuence of
imitation becomes larger (and sometimes even turns signiﬁcant) with commu-
nication. In other words, communication results in more imitation and less
Cournot play (best response). Even though we sometimes ﬁnd that ethnicity or
gender signiﬁcantly aﬀect the outcome, these two factors do not have a consis-
tent eﬀect across treatments. Moreover, these factors are hardly signiﬁcant in
the triopoly treatments.
Result 5: In all treatments, the outcome adjustment is explained by the pre-
vious round’s best response strategy. In the treatments with communication,
the eﬀect of imitation becomes larger and crowds out the eﬀect of myopic best
20Like Huck et al. (1999), we performed Goldfeld-Quandt tests for all treatments, but we
could not reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity.
21response.
Although imitation of the most successful ﬁrm leads to the competitive out-
come (Vega-Redondo, 1997), our results indicate that in duopoly imitation is
used rather as a way of coordinating collusion. By selecting a smaller (more
collusive) quantity, a ﬁrm “leads” its competitor (by example) to collusion.
6 Concluding Remarks
This experimental study of Cournot oligopoly investigates the impact of pre-
play communication on ﬁrms’ (subjects’) performance. For this purpose, we
allow subjects to communicate either by using pre-deﬁned expressions (so-called
“standardized communication ”) or by using a chat box for free communication.
Moreover, we investigate the eﬀect of communication in duopoly and triopoly
on two subject pools: students and managers. Regarding the eﬀect of pre-play
communication, we ﬁnd ﬁrst that the eﬀect of communication on collusion is
larger in duopoly than in triopoly, all other conditions being equal. In fact,
communication does not aﬀect managers in triopoly. Second, managers behave
in a similar way under both communication devices, while students are more
inﬂuenced by the free-communication than by the standardized-communication
device. Finally, inspecting the individual data, we ﬁnd that in all treatments
output adjustment is explained to some extent by the previous round’s best
response strategy. In the treatments with communication, the eﬀect of imitation
becomes larger and crowds out the eﬀect of myopic best response.
Regarding the eﬀect of the subject pool on performance, we extend the results
reported in Waichman et al. (2010a,b) for the case where communication is
allowed. We ﬁnd that managers select lower aggregate quantities than students
in all duopoly treatments. In triopoly, on the other hand, managers only select
22lower aggregate quantities than students when communication is not allowed. In
other words, communication increases the diﬀerence between the subject pools
in duopoly but reduces this diﬀerence in triopoly.
Regarding the eﬀect of industry size, we ﬁnd that there are lower aggregate
quantities and notably a higher incidence of collusion in duopoly than in tri-
opoly. Finally, we establish that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity quite
accurately describes the performance of the markets without communication
in duopoly, but when communication is allowed, the performance of the mar-
kets is more collusive than this quantity suggests. In triopoly, however, the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity accurately describes the behavior of almost
all markets.
In sum, our main observation is that even in duopoly with communication,
subjects in general do not manage to maintain collusion. This result implies that
although computer-mediated communication results in lower aggregate quanti-
ties, this is still not enough to ensure collusion, even in duopoly. Bicchieri and
Lev-On (2007) identify two conditions for the establishment of collusion: the
capability to coordinate mutual promising and the credibility of promises. Re-
garding the former, face-to-face communication is more likely than computer-
mediated communication (or exchange of notes) to foster leaderships which
positively impact collusion (see, for example, Orbell et al., 1988). In addition,
face-to-face communication allows subjects to use visual, verbal, and social cues
to form expectations that may make their mutual promises credible. Accord-
ingly, it seems promising for further research to relax the condition of anonymity
and allow for face-to-face communication.
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Figure 1: The 2x2x3 experimental design
Collusive outcomes Cournot-Nash outcomes Competitive outcomes
(QM) (QN
n ) (QC)
Duopoly (n = 2) 49.5 66 99
(range) {0,...,57.75} {57.75,...,82.5} {82.5,...,200}
Triopoly (n = 3) 49.5 74.25 99
(range) {0,...,61.87} {61.87,...,86.62} {86.62,...,300}
Table 1: The three benchmark market outcomes and their corresponding ranges
30Market No communication Standardized communication Free communication
Students
SNC SSC SFC
Markets (Subjects) 12 (24) 11 (22) 17 (34)
% Females 54 72 59
% Chinese 25 40 59
Managers
MNC MSC MFC
Markets (Subjects) 10 (20) 12 (24) 12 (24)
% Females 42 54 50
% Chinese 90 100 100
Average age 34.1 29.8 34.0
(a) Characteristics of subjects in the duopoly treatments
Market No communication Standardized communication Free communication
Students
SNC SSC SFC
Markets (Subjects) 13 (39) 10 (30) 11 (33)
% Females 53 53 63
% Chinese 82 86 24
Managers
MNC MSC MFC
Markets (Subjects) 11 (33) 11 (33) 10 (30)
% Females 42 42 53
% Chinese 90 84 90
Average age 38.2 36.9 35.4
(b) Characteristics of subjects in the triopoly treatments
Table 2: Characteristics of the diﬀerent treatments (abbreviations are given in
bold letters).
31Market No communication Standardized communication Free-communication
¯ Q1−17 ¯ Q1−15 ¯ Q3−15 ¯ Q1−17 ¯ Q1−15 ¯ Q3−15 ¯ Q1−17 ¯ Q1−15 ¯ Q3−15
Students
Average 68.26 67.97 68.54 63.50 63.01 63.94 59.44 59.40 59.17
median 67.82 67.76 67.57 62.76 61 61.53 58.64 57.86 58.61
SD 6.00 6.51 6.45 9.53 9.19 11.13 5.62 5.58 5.52
% change 6.98 7.29 6.70 12.29 12.61 13.67
Managers
Average 65.53 65.35 66.76 56.25 56.01 56.31 55.79 56.14 55.67
median 62.85 62.63 63.80 55.02 54.43 55.15 55.17 55.30 55.38
SD 9.75 10.29 10.38 4.29 4.42 4.45 6.43 6.48 6.77
% change 14.15 14.29 15.65 14.86 14.04 16.61
(a) Descriptive statistics of the duopoly treatments
Market No communication Standardized communication Free-communication
¯ Q1−17 ¯ Q1−15 ¯ Q3−15 ¯ Q1−17 ¯ Q1−15 ¯ Q3−15 ¯ Q1−17 ¯ Q1−15 ¯ Q3−15
Students
Average 80.81 81.04 80.81 75.81 76.50 75.99 71.98 71.77 71.62
median 78.64 79.06 78.53 76.58 77.15 75.93 71.52 72.06 72.76
SD 10.08 10.94 10.22 10.36 11.25 11.57 9.88 9.72 9.40
% change 6.19 5.59 5.95 10.93 11.43 11.37
Managers
Average 75.63 75.66 75.78 70.93 70.52 70.67 71.97 72.42 70.71
median 74.05 74.40 73.69 73.35 72.60 73.38 71.80 71.80 69.88
SD 5.82 6.31 6.69 6.61 6.94 6.58 13.48 14.05 14.76
% change 6.21 6.78 6.73 4.83 4.28 6.66
(b) Descriptive statistics of the triopoly treatments
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the average aggregate quantities selected in
the diﬀerent duopoly and triopoly treatments. The quantities are averaged
over all rounds ( ¯ Q1−17), over the ﬁrst 15 rounds ( ¯ Q1−15), and over rounds 3 to
15 ( ¯ Q3−15). “% change” describes the percentage change of average performance
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Incidence of collusion (number of rounds)
MNC MSC MFC
(d) Triopoly: The manager sample
Figure 2: Percentage of total markets in each treatment colluding for 0, 1, 2
rounds, etc. For example, the incidence of collusion of a market that does not
even achieve collusion in a single round is denoted by 0. The collusion incidence
of a market maintaining collusion for a total of 10 rounds is denoted by 10, etc.
33Subject pool Oligopoly size Diﬀerence between treatments
Students n=2 SNC >∗∗∗ SFC SNC >∗ SSC SSC = SFC
Students n=3 SNC >∗∗∗ SFC SNC = SSC SSC = SFC
Managers n=2 SNC >∗∗∗ SFC SNC >∗∗∗ SSC SSC = SFC
Managers n=3 SNC = SFC SNC = SSC SSC = SFC
(a) Comparison between market quantities
Subject pool Oligopoly size Diﬀerences between treatments
Students n=2 SNC >∗∗∗ SFC SNC >∗∗ SSC SSC = SFC
Students n=3 SNC >∗∗∗ SFC SNC >∗∗ SSC SSC = SFC
Managers n=2 SNC >∗∗∗ SFC SNC >∗∗∗ SSC SSC = SFC
Managers n=3 SNC = SFC SNC = SSC SSC = SFC
(b) Comparison between incidence of collusion
Table 4: Communication eﬀect: Results of a two-sided F-P test between each
pair of treatments. *,**, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels.
Communication Oligopoly size Diﬀerence between treatments
No communication n=2 Students >∗ Managers
Standardized communication n=2 Students >∗∗∗ Managers
Free communication n=2 Students >∗∗ Managers
No communication n=3 Students >∗ Managers
Standardized communication n=3 Students = Managers
Free communication n=3 Students = Managers
(a) Comparison between market quantities
Communication Oligopoly size Diﬀerences between treatments
No communication n=2 Students = Managers
Standardized communication n=2 Students >∗∗∗ Managers
Free communication n=2 Students >∗ Managers
No communication n=3 Students = Managers
Standardized communication n=3 Students = Managers
Free communication n=3 Students = Managers
(b) Comparison between incidence of collusion
Table 5: Subject-pool eﬀect: Results of a two-sided F-P test between each pair
of treatments. *,**, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
3440 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84 88
SNC MNC SSC MSC SFC MFC
Quantity
(a) The duopoly treatments
40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84 88
SNC MNC SSC MSC SFC MFC
Quantity
(b) The triopoly treatments
Figure 3: Independent average quantities (over the middle periods, 3-15) across
duopoly and triopoly treatments. The vertical dashed lines denote the collusive
and Cournot outcomes.
35SNC SSC SFC MNC MSC MFC
β1 0.64*** 0.31*** 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.35*** 0.31***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.12)
β2 0.09 0.22*** 0.72*** 0.22* 0.33*** 0.30***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.03) (0.04)
β3 -0.54 -2.29* 3.51** 1.06 - -
(1.16) (1.19) (1.55) (1.57)
β4 -4,94*** -0.21 -2.03 -2.23 0.857** 0.05
(1.42) (1.12) (1.58) (2.02) (0.03) (0.62)
β0 3.71** 0.56 3.53*** 0.35 -2.96*** -2.61*
(1.21) (1.16) (0.84) (1.70) (0.68) (1.45)
Obs 384 352 544 320 384 384
F − test 41*** 31*** 151*** 36*** 70*** 14***
R2 0.40 0.28 0.78 0.35 0.35 0.35
(a) OLS estimation of individual behavior in duopoly
SNC SSC SFC MNC MSC MFC
β1 0.34*** 0.29*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.37*** 0.24***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06)
β2 0.11** 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.17 0.28*** 0.26***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.04)
β3 1.53* -0.57 -3.03** 0.93 0.99 1.59
(0.86) (2.72) (1.42) (1.57) (0.98) (1.97)
β4 -1.64 -0.96 0.32 -0.41 0.37 -0.72
(0.68) (1.07) (1.04) (1.57) (0.73) (1.02)
β0 1.09 1.32 0.09 0.29 -1.18 1.04
(0.82) (2.47) (0.76) (1.64) (1.11) (2.22)
Obs 624 480 528 528 528 480
F − test 144*** 38*** 134*** 40*** 11*** 92***
R2 0.26 0.35 0.38 0.26 0.38 0.29
(b) OLS estimation of individual behavior in triopoly
Table 6: OLS estimations of individual behavior. *,**, and *** denote signiﬁ-
cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
36A Instructions and Screens
A.1 Instructions: Triopoly
• Welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions carefully!
From now until the end of the experiment you are not allowed to commu-
nicate with the other participants. If you have any question, please raise
your hand, and we will answer them individually.
• At the beginning of the experiment, each one of you will be assigned a
number. From then on, you and the other participants will be identiﬁed
by this number. Please keep it until you receive your payment. In ad-
dition, there are two empty sheets of paper that you can use during the
experiment.
• In this experiment you will repeatedly be asked to make decisions that can
earn you a reasonable amount of money. How much you earn depends not
only on your decisions but also on the decisions of the other participants.
• All participants receive the same instructions.
• In this experiment you represent a ﬁrm, the same as two other ﬁrms, that
produces and sells the same product on the market. You will be matched
with the same two ﬁrms during the whole experiment.
• You will stay anonymous from the other ﬁrms, both during and after the
experiment.
• In each period all ﬁrms have to make one decision, namely what quantity
they wish to produce.
• The cost of production is 1 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) per unit
(this holds for all ﬁrms).
• The following important rule holds: The higher the total (aggregate) quan-
tity produced by all ﬁrms, the lower the price in the market. Moreover,
from a certain amount of total output upwards the price will be zero.
• Your proﬁt per unit of output will be the diﬀerence between the market
price and the unit cost of 1 ECU. Note that you will incur a loss if the
market price is below the unit cost. Your proﬁt per period is thus equal
to the proﬁt per unit multiplied by the number of units you sell.
• [The standardized communication treatment:] This experiment is
a two-stage experiment. In the ﬁrst stage (called chat-phase) for two
minutes you will have the opportunity to communicate with the other
ﬁrms in the market by suggesting your quantity to sell and the other
ﬁrms’ quantities to sell. You also have a button “I agree” and “I do not
agree”). You are not limited in the number of messages you can write.
Recall that the others will never know your personal identity. In the
37second stage (called real-decision phase) you will make your real decision
of quantity. In this stage you cannot communicate with the others but
you can still see the chat window.
• [The free-communication treatment:] This experiment is a two-stage
experiment. In the ﬁrst stage (called chat-phase) for two minutes you will
have the opportunity to communicate freely with the other ﬁrms in the
market using a chat window (you send your chat using Enter). You are
not limited in the number of messages you can write. However, you are
not allowed to identify yourself in any way. You are only allowed to write
messages in English. In the second stage (called real-decision phase) you
will make your real decision of quantity. In this stage you cannot chat
with the others but you can still see the chat window.
• [The common and free-communication treatments:] During the
experiment (both in the ’chat-phase’ and in the ’decision-phase’) you can
use a ’proﬁt calculator’ before you decide on the quantity to produce. This
proﬁt calculator helps you simulate the possible outcomes in the markets.
You enter your quantity and the total (aggregate) quantity of the other
two ﬁrms and the ’proﬁt calculator’ will calculate your earnings.
• [No communication treatment:] During the experiment you can use
a ’proﬁt calculator’ before you decide on the quantity to produce. This
proﬁt calculator helps you simulate the possible outcomes in the markets.
You enter your quantity and the total (aggregate) quantity of the other
two ﬁrms and the ’proﬁt calculator’ will calculate your earnings.
• In each period, the output decisions of the other two ﬁrms will be regis-
tered, the corresponding price determined, and the proﬁts computed.
• After each period, you will receive information about the quantity chosen
by you, the aggregate quantity chosen by the other two ﬁrms, your proﬁt
in the current period, and your commutative proﬁt starting from the ﬁrst
period.
• The experiment consists of exactly 17 periods.
• During the experiment, all payoﬀs are given in ECU. Each participant
starts with an initial amount of 500 ECU.
• After the experiment we will convert your proﬁt to RM. The exchange
rate is 81.5 ECU/RM, that is, 81.5 ECU is equal to 1 RM.21
• Your total proﬁt in the experiment is the total amount you earned in the
17 periods of the experiment (plus the initial amount of 500 ECU).
• At the end of the experiment we will calculate your money payoﬀ reward.
This will be done in a way that ensures that the other participants will
21The currencies and the exchange rates diﬀered across treatments.
38not see how much you earned, and you will not see how much they earned.
You will receive your money immediately in cash.
39A.2 Computer screens
Figure A.1: The computer screens in rounds 2-25 of the experiment (no com-
munication treatment). The proﬁt calculator is located on the left-hand side of
the screen. The results of the previous round are shown on the upper right-hand
side of the screen, while the output decision is taken on its bottom right-hand
side.
40Figure A.2: The communication stage (standardized-communication treatment)
in rounds 2-17 of the experiment. The proﬁt calculator is located on the left-
hand side of the screen. The results of the previous round are shown on the
upper right-hand side of the screen, while the communication is done and dis-
played on its bottom right-hand side.
41Figure A.3: The decision stage (standardized-communication treatment) in
rounds 2-17 of the experiment. The proﬁt calculator is located on the left-
hand side of the screen. The results of the previous round are shown on the
upper right-hand side of the screen, while the communication is displayed on the
middle right-hand side and the output decision is taken on its bottom right-hand
side.
42Figure A.4: The communication stage (free-communication treatment) in
rounds 2-17 of the experiment. The proﬁt calculator is located on the left-hand
side of the screen. The results of the previous round are shown on the upper
right-hand side of the screen, while the communication is done and displayed
on its bottom right-hand side.
43Figure A.5: The decision stage (free-communication treatment) in rounds 2-17
of the experiment. The proﬁt calculator is located on the left-hand side of the
screen. The results of the previous round are shown on the upper right-hand side
of the screen, while the communication is displayed on the middle right-hand
side and the output decision is taken on its bottom right-hand side.
44B Individual Characteristics of the manager sample (not for publication)
Table B.1: Characteristics of the Duopoly MNC manager sample. In the “Ethnicity” column, “C” means Malaysian of Chinese
descent and “I” means Malaysian of Indian descent. In the gender column, “M” means male and “F” means female.
Nr. Gender Ethnicity Age Degree Job Description Industry
1 M M 26 Bachelor Safety manager Plastic molding and coloring
2 M C 38 Bachelor Production planner Computer assembler
3 M C 27 Bachelor Production manager Automation
4 F C 29 Bachelor Senior accountant Hardware
5 M C 36 Bachelor Unit sales manager Insurance
6 M C 39 Bachelor Production manager Frozen food company
7 M C 35 Bachelor Investment manager Frozen food company
8 M C 29 Bachelor Deputy Director Ministry of Finance
9 F C 30 Bachelor Promotion (marketing and sales) manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
10 F C 36 Bachelor Sales (team) manager Computer chip and parts manufacturer
11 F C 37 Bachelor Production manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
12 F C 40 Bachelor Director Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
13 F C 38 Bachelor Strategic consultant Automation
14 F C 33 Bachelor Manager of human resources Plastic molding and coloring
15 M I 36 Bachelor Production manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
16 F C 36 Bachelor Head of human resources Finance and banking
17 F C 35 Bachelor Promotion (marketing and sales) manager Jewelry
18 F C 38 Bachelor Financial consultant Finance and banking
19 F C 26 Bachelor Senior accountant Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
20 M C 39 Bachelor Chief technician Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
4
5Table B.2: Characteristics of the Duopoly MSC manager sample. In the “Ethnicity” column, “C” means Malaysian of Chinese
descent and “I” means Malaysian of Indian descent. In the gender column, “M” means male and “F” means female.
Nr. Gender Ethnicity Age Degree Job Description Industry
1 M C 37 Bachelor Branch manager Jewelry
2 M C 35 Bachelor Senior accountant Finance and banking
3 F C 28 Bachelor Production manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
4 F C 35 Bachelor Head of IT department Telecommunication
5 F C 31 Bachelor Administration manager Plastic molding and coloring
6 M C 37 Bachelor Production manager Hardware
7 F C 31 Bachelor Production planner Cable manufacturer
8 M C 31 Bachelor Marketing (strategy) manager Automation
9 F C 30 Bachelor Head of IT department Telecommunication
10 M C 27 Bachelor Chief oﬃcer for labor relations Chief ministry of Penang
11 F C 26 Bachelor Strategic consultant NGO
12 F C 28 Bachelor Production manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
13 F C 34 Bachelor Production manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
14 F C 27 Bachelor Researcher (chemist) Chemical industry
15 M C 28 Bachelor Head of IT department Computer chip and parts manufacturer
16 F C 27 Bachelor Production manager Plastic molding and coloring
17 M C 26 Bachelor Accountant Computer chip and parts manufacturer
18 M C 31 Bachelor Production manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
19 F C 28 Bachelor Production manager Computer assembler
20 M C 25 Bachelor Researcher (chemist) Chemical industry
21 M C 29 Bachelor Financial consultant Finance and banking
22 F C 28 Bachelor Sales (team) manager Insurance
23 M C 32 Bachelor Production planner Plastic molding and coloring
24 F C 26 Bachelor Accountant Finance and banking
4
6Table B.3: Characteristics of the Duopoly MFC manager sample. In the “Ethnicity” column, “C” means Malaysian of Chinese
descent and “I” means Malaysian of Indian descent. In the gender column, “M” means male and “F” means female.
Nr. Gender Ethnicity Age Degree Job Description Industry
1 F C 36 Bachelor Head of IT department Telecommunication
2 M C 32 Bachelor Sales (team) manager Plastic molding and coloring
3 F C 30 Bachelor Administration manager Computer assembler
4 F C 36 Bachelor Operation director Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
5 F C 29 Bachelor Administration manager Finance and banking
6 F C 31 Bachelor Administration manager Plastic molding and coloring
7 F C 39 Bachelor Factory Manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
8 M C 35 Bachelor Safety manager Telecommunication
9 F C 33 Bachelor Head of IT department Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
10 M C 36 Bachelor Head of human resources Computer assembler
11 F C 36 Bachelor Production planner Plastic
12 M C 37 Bachelor Production manager Hardware
13 F C 31 Bachelor Production planner Cable manufacturer
14 F C 38 Bachelor Consultant Human resource consultancy
15 M C 45 PhD Director Plastic molding and coloring
16 M C 35 Bachelor Strategic consultant Finance and banking
17 F C 39 Bachelor Sales (team) manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
18 M C 35 Bachelor Promotion (marketing and sales) manager Chemical Industry
19 M C 38 Bachelor Promotion (marketing and sales) manager Insurance
20 M C 26 Bachelor Production manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
21 M C 26 Bachelor Accountant Computer chip and parts manufacturer
22 M C 27 Bachelor Senior accountant Computer chip and parts manufacturer
23 M C 41 Bachelor Head of human resources Cable manufacturer
24 F C 26 Bachelor Strategic consultant Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
4
7Table B.4: Characteristics of the Triopoly MNC manager sample. In the “Ethnicity” column, “C” means Malaysian of Chinese
descent and “I” means Malaysian of Indian descent. In the gender column, “M” means male and “F” means female.
Nr. Gender Ethnicity Age Degree Job Description Industry
1 M I 42 Bachelor Sales (team) manager Finance and banking
2 F C 38 Bachelor Promotion (marketing and sales) manager Plastic molding and coloring
3 F C 50 Bachelor Administration Manager Finance and banking
4 F I 36 Bachelor Head of human resources Computer chip and parts manufacturer
5 M I 39 Bachelor Safety Manager Cable assembler
6 M C 40 Bachelor Factory Manager Plastic molding and coloring
7 F C 39 Bachelor Head of human resources Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
8 M C 36 Bachelor Senior Accountant Computer chip and parts manufacturer
9 F C 36 Bachelor Senior Accountant Computer assembler
10 M C 36 Bachelor Administration manager Prime minister oﬃce
11 F C 35 Bachelor Production manager Cable assembler
12 M C 37 PhD Investment manager Computer chip and parts manufacturer
13 M C 39 Bachelor Production manager Computer assembler
14 M C 54 PhD Operation director Plastic Molding and coloring
15 F C 36 Bachelor Safety manager Computer chip and parts manufacturer
16 F C 38 Bachelor Senior accountant Finance and banking
17 F C 36 Bachelor Purchasing Manager Plastic molding and coloring
18 M C 38 Bachelor Promotion (marketing and sales) manager Plastic molding and coloring
19 M C 35 Bachelor Senior accountant Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
20 M C 29 Bachelor Head of human resources Computer assembler
21 M C 38 Bachelor Head of IT department Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
23 F C 38 Bachelor Production manager Computer assembler
24 F C 37 Bachelor Administration Manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
25 M C 42 Bachelor Branch Manager of a Bank Finance and banking
26 F C 39 Bachelor Senior accountant Finance and banking
27 M C 36 Bachelor Safety Manager Computer assembler
28 M C 38 Bachelor Branch (regional) Manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
29 M C 39 Bachelor Production Manager Computer assembler
30 F C 37 Bachelor Production Planner Plastic molding and coloring
31 M C 35 Bachelor Promotion (marketing and sales) manager Plastic molding and coloring
32 F C 37 Bachelor Promotion (marketing and sales) manager Computer assembler
33 M C 36 Bachelor Production manager Computer chip and parts manufacturer
34 M C 41 Bachelor Promotion (marketing and sales) manager Education company focuses in trainee education
4
8Table B.5: Characteristics of the Triopoly MSC manager sample. In the “Ethnicity” column, “C” means Malaysian of Chinese
descent and “I” means Malaysian of Indian descent. In the gender column, “M” means male and “F” means female.
Nr. Gender Ethnicity Age Degree Job Description Industry
1 M C 35 Bachelor Sales (team manager) Computer chip and parts manufacturer
2 M C 42 Bachelor Administration manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
3 M C 54 PhD Operation director Plastic molding and coloring
4 M C 36 Bachelor Factory Manager Cable assembler
5 F C 38 Bachelor Production manager Computer assembler
6 F C 33 Bachelor Administration manager Plastic molding and coloring
7 M C 36 Bachelor Safety manager Computer assembler
8 M C 36 Bachelor Head of IT department Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
9 F C 38 Bachelor Head of human resources Cable assembler
10 F C 35 Bachelor Production manager Cable assembler
11 F C 35 Bachelor Production Planner Plastic molding and coloring
12 F C 38 Master Senior accountant Computer assembler
13 M C 36 Bachelor Purchasing manager Computer assembler
14 M C 39 Bachelor Sales (team) manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
15 M M 36 Bachelor Strategic consultant Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
16 F C 35 Bachelor Promotion (marketing and sales) manager Computer chip and parts manufacturer
17 M C 38 Bachelor Sales (team) manager Computer chip and parts manufacturer
18 F C 35 Bachelor Promotion (marketing and sales) manager Cable assembler
19 M M 45 Bachelor Branch manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
20 F C 36 Bachelor Head of IT department Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
21 F C 38 Bachelor Business strategy manager Plastic molding and coloring
22 M M 36 Bachelor Production manager Computer assembler
23 F I 35 Bachelor Senior accountant Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
24 M C 36 Bachelor Sales (team) manager Computer chip and parts manufacturer
25 F C 36 Bachelor Safety manager Computer chip and parts manufacturer
26 M C 35 Bachelor Production manager Computer assembler
27 M C 29 Bachelor Manager of human resources Computer assembler
28 M C 35 Bachelor Senior accountant Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
29 M C 36 Bachelor Senior accountant Computer chip and parts manufacturer
30 M C 37 Master Investment manager Computer chip and parts manufacturer
31 M C 38 Bachelor Branch manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
32 F C 36 Bachelor Senior accountant Computer assembler
33 F M 37 PhD Head of human resources Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
4
9Table B.6: Characteristics of the Triopoly MFC manager sample. In the “Ethnicity” column, “C” means Malaysian of Chinese
descent and “I” means Malaysian of Indian descent. In the gender column, “M” means male and “F” means female.
Nr. Gender Ethnicity Age Degree Job Description Industry
1 F C 36 Bachelor Head of IT department Telecommunication
2 M C 32 Bachelor Sales (team) manager Plastic molding and coloring
3 F C 31 Bachelor Administration manager Plastic molding and coloring
4 F C 28 Bachelor Sales (team) manager Insurance
5 F C 26 Bachelor Production manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
6 M C 31 Bachelor Marketing manager Automation
7 F C 30 Bachelor Head of IT department Telecommunication
8 M C 37 Bachelor Production manager Hardware
9 F C 31 Bachelor Production planner Cable manufacturer
10 F C 45 Bachelor Branch manager Finance
11 M C 36 Bachelor Marketing manager Private collage
12 F C 35 Bachelor Communication Manager Transportation
13 M C 31 Bachelor Production manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
14 F C 28 Bachelor Production manager Computer assembler
15 M C 38 Bachelor Head of IT department Computer assembler
16 M C 26 Bachelor Safety manager Automation
17 F C 33 Bachelor Head of human resources Plastic molding and coloring
18 M I 36 Bachelor Production manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
19 M C 36 Bachelor Owner Hardware
20 F C 34 Bachelor Production manager Electric and electronic related good manufacturer
21 M I 36 Bachelor Administration manager Computer assembler
22 M C 39 Master Engineer Telecommunication
23 F C 41 Bachelor Financial consultant Bank
24 F C 38 Bachelor Consultant Human resources consultancy
25 F C 37 Bachelor Production manager Plastic molding and coloring
26 M C 38 Bachelor Administration manager Computer assembler
27 F C 42 Master Marketing manager Private collage
28 F C 40 Bachelor Owner Financial planning company
29 M C 39 Master Investment manager Financial consultancy company
30 M I 52 Bachelor Owner Company for library supplies
31 M C 48 Master Owner/Partner Financial consultancy company
32 M C 36 Bachelor Marketing manager Finance








2: “I also dunno”
2: “You sell[?], how much[?]”
1: “Can we try 30... [to] test [the] market”






1: “Are we competitors, or in the same group?”
2: “We [are] in the same group.”
1: “I see”
2: “ [We are] no[t] competitors, what are you gonna put this round?”
1: “About 30”
2: “[Do] you want to increase to 32”
1:“”
1: “Is that ok”
2:“ok, you put 30”
1: “Sure”
2: “We earn Kau kau”
1: “Great, haha, it is great to have such partner”
2: “Muhaha, same to you”
1: “ ;) ”
(2 selected 35, 1 selected 25...)
Some others
1: “You 5, I 50”
2: “[It is] too early to dream”
1: “You obviously do not want to cooperate”
2: “So, this time, how many do you want?”
Round 9
1: “How nice and peaceful the world if everyone is like you”




“Greediness is one of the worst things, but you make me feel the world has still
hope...”
Round 13
1: “I just want to earn money”
2: “Yes, same goal.”
1: “Business is earning[!]”
Round 17
“Money is coming to you and me”
C.2 Managers triopoly
Round 3
1: “[It is] better [to] put lower output”
2: “How come [that] my proﬁt become - ?”
1: “My proﬁt become negative, we are the same”
3: “Mine too”
2: “So what’s next[?]”
1: “No idea”
2: “Is there a wrong number to put[?]”
3. “Of course... [aggregate] output is 83 total”
2: “Oh, I see”
Round 6
1: “Someone produced extra”
2: “ya”
1: “If [we] continue like that, then the balance will go oﬀ, [and we] end up
nobody earns come to any conclusion”
2: “I agree to plan”
1: “OK, we will stick to it, then we will see next round how”
Round 17
1: “If we have a chance to do business I know I can trust you ﬁrm 2, but not
52[ﬁrm] 3”
(Subject 3 did not answer...)
53